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IN THE NAVY: THE FUTURE STRENGTH OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS UNDER NEPA
IN LIGHT OF NRDC V. WINTER
William Krueger'
A preliminary injunction is an incredibly useful and important
tool in cases involving the enforcement of environmental statutes
and regulations. Parties hoping to protect the environment will
often seek preliminary injunctions to prevent environmental harm
from occurring while the case is being litigated in court. In Winter
v. National Resource Defense Council (NRDC), the Supreme
Court held that a lower court acted improperly in issuing a
preliminary injunction that placed restrictions on the Navy's
ability to conduct training exercises off the coast of southern
California. The Court's decision in this case is improper and calls
into question the efficacy of preliminary injunctions in future
environmental enforcement cases, especially when it comes to
cases brought against the military. In cases like this one, the
Court should adopt a new approach in reviewing preliminary
injunctions that will uphold the power and meaning of
environmental protection laws.
I. INTRODUCTION: INJUNCTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Since the 1970s, many laws have been passed with the
overarching goal of protecting the environment.2 Without proper
enforcement of environmental protection laws, the environment
will likely suffer from increased pollution levels and less
biological diversity. Therefore, it is critical to ensure that these
laws are enforced. A person or agency with proper standing can
bring a citizen suit to enforce environmental protection laws
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
2 See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000) (passing the most
extensive portions in 1970); see also National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1969, § 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2000).
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against alleged perpetrators. To ensure that the perpetrator does
not continue to harm the environment while the action is pending
in court, the plaintiff will often seek a preliminary injunction4 to
force the perpetrator to stop or alter his environmentally
detrimental practices.' Without the preliminary injunction,
enforcement of environmental statutes would be much more
difficult.
On November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council.6 The
Court's primary concern in this case was whether a preliminary
injunction which forbade the Navy's use of mid-frequency active
("MFA") sonar' during certain portions of its submarine training
exercises off the coast of southern California was properly issued.
The injunction was sought by the National Resources Defense
Council (NRDC),' a handful of other environmental interest
3 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000).
4 A preliminary injunction is a "temporary injunction issued before or during a
trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a
chance to decide the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8th ed. 2004).
5 See W. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (noting that an
injunction should be issued "where the intervention of a court of equity is
essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise
irremediable." (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
6 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
7 MFA sonar is used to detect objects in the water. A constant frequency is
good for detecting movement of objects, but can become overwhelmed in areas
with high reflectivity for sonar. As a result, tactical MFA sonar often involves
the use of both constant and rapidly shifting frequencies to detect exactly what is
surrounding the sonar's source. MFA sonar typically has a frequency between 2
and 10 kHz, and has been linked to whales stranding themselves on beaches.
See generally U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE & SEC. OF THE NAVY, JOINT INTERIM
REPORT BAHAMAS MARINE MAMMAL STRANDING EVENT OF 15-16 MARCH
2000 (December 2001), available at http://www.awionline.org/oceans/Noise/
InterimBahamas_Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370-71.
9 Established in 1970, the NRDC is an environmental interest group that aims
to "protect wildlife and wild places and to ensure a healthy environment for all
life on earth." NRDC: About NRDC, http://www.nrdc.org/about/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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groups, and several concerned citizens. The injunction was
granted by the United States District Court for the Central District
of California on January 3, 2008,"o and upheld by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on February 29, 2008." The district
court granted the injunction because the Navy failed to comply
with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).12 Specifically, the Navy failed to prepare an adequate
Environmental Assessment (EA)" or a subsequent Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS),14 both of which must be prepared for
proposed "major Federal actions significantly affecting the human
environment."" The injunction imposed several restrictions on the
Navy's ability to use its MFA sonar in training exercises."
The Navy eventually appealed to the Supreme Court, which
published three very divided opinions." The Roberts majority
opined that the environmentalists' interests were "plainly
The NRDC has over three hundred attorneys on its staff and has been party to
numerous cases seeking enforcement of environmental regulations. Id.
10 NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
"i NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008).
12 See Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1113-17. The injunction was designed to
allow the Navy to continue its training exercises while lowering its impact on
the environment. Id NEPA was enacted to force government agencies to
consider the environmental impacts of their actions. See infra notes 28-42 and
accompanying text.
1 40 C.F.R. § 1,508.9 (2008). An EA must describe the action that will be
taken by the government agency, discuss in detail its potential impacts on the
environment, and do the same for alternatives to the agency's proposed action.
The findings in the EA help an agency, in conjunction with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), determine if a more extensive EIS is required. See id.
14 An EIS must be prepared by a government agency after that agency has
prepared an EA and found that its actions will significantly impact the
environment. The EIS must detail the effects the agency's actions will have on
the environment and must discuss alternatives to the agency's proposed action.
The agency first issues a draft EIS which the agency then submits to the public
and other government agencies for comment. The agency must consider and
respond to these comments in its final EIS. This forces government agencies to
take environmental issues into account when deciding on courses of action. See
CAA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
's 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000); Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
16 Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-21.
17 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S.Ct. 365, 369 (2008).
SPRING 2009] 425
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
outweighed by the Navy's need to conduct realistic training
exercises."'" The majority focused on two primary factors before
holding that the district court had abused its discretion by granting
a preliminary injunction." First, the Court challenged the level of
probability that the district court assigned to the likelihood of the
plaintiffs' success at trial.20 Second, the Court felt that neither the
district court nor the Ninth Circuit adequately considered the
balance of equities between the plaintiffs and the Navy.2' For these
two reasons, the Court held that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing the injunctive measures challenged here by
the Navy.22 Therefore, the Court vacated the portion of the district
court's injunction that the Navy challenged.23
There were two other opinions which differed from the
majority. Justice Bryer, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
believed that the proper solution was an injunction restricting the
Navy's use of MFA. However, the injunction should not be as
stringent as the district court's original injunction.24 On the other
hand, Justice Ginsburg, who dissented, would have affirmed the
lower courts' decisions and upheld the district court's injunction.2 5
Her dissent focused on the "central question" of "whether the Navy
must prepare an [EIS]."26 Justice Ginsburg believed that by
attempting to circumvent the NEPA process, the Navy's actions in
this case "undermined NEPA" by appealing to the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), a division of the White House. 27
The outcome of this case is both unfortunate and improper. Its
result is a signal that the Court is likely to continue to give
'Id at 382.
19 Id. at 374-81.
20 Id. at 375-76. That is to say, the Supreme Court did not think that the
plaintiffs were very likely to win this case if it had gone to trial in the district
court. Id.
21 Id. at 376-81.
22 Id. at 382.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25 Id. at 393 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 387.
27 Id. at 389; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344 (2000) (establishing and
defining the functions and duties of the CEQ).
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extraordinary deference to the military in environmental cases
which may involve matters of national security, without any
attempt to look into the circumstances of the military's assertions
of national security interests. This case also shows how easy it has
become for agencies, particularly military branches, to avoid
adhering to laws like NEPA. Courts should be more willing to
grant preliminary injunctions when it comes to NEPA enforcement
actions, lest agencies be allowed to do as they will without any
regard to the rule of law. Without more stringent NEPA
enforcement by the courts, the Act's purposes of "sensitiz[ing] ...
federal agencies to the environment" and "foster[ing] precious
resource preservation" will be thwarted.28
This Recent Development explains the law involved in Winter,
examines the particulars of the Court's various arguments, and
offers a critique of the Court's approach to the questions at hand.
Part II discusses the legal framework of NEPA and the basic law
behind preliminary injunctions. Part III relates the factual and
procedural history of the case. Part IV discusses the three opinions
issued in this case. Part V offers an argument in favor of a
different approach that courts ought to adopt when reviewing
preliminary injunctions under NEPA.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK:
NEPA AND THE CEQ
A. The NEPA Process
The National Environmental Policy Act29 was passed in 1969
to:
[E]ncourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems
28 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 184 (4th Cir.
2005).
29 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
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and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a
Council on Environmental Quality. 30
NEPA achieves this goal by requiring that every government
agency comply with certain procedural requirements before an
agency takes any action which may harm the environment.'
The central procedural requirement of NEPA is the EIS.32 An
agency must prepare an EIS any time it proposes to take an action
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."3
An EIS must detail the following:
i) [T]he environmental impact of the proposed action,
ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.34
Before an agency prepares an EIS, the agency must first
determine if its proposed action will have enough effect on the
environment to warrant an EIS. To do this, the agency will prepare
an EA.3 ' An EA serves largely the same function as an EIS, but it
is often less formal and less extensive.36
Once an agency creates an EA, it can come to one of three
conclusions. The agency can find that its actions will have a
significant impact on the environment, thus requiring an EIS."
30 NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). It is important to note that while
NEPA requires agencies to comply with these procedures, it does not force
agencies to make choices that benefit the environment. The agency must only
give proper consideration to environmental concerns. See id.
31 See id. § 102(2).
32 See id.; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
" NEPA § 102(2)(C).
34 id
3 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2008); see also supra note 13 and accompanying
text for a description of EAs.
36 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (describing an EA as a "concise public document"
meant to "briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare" an EIS).
n See NEPA § 102(2).
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Alternatively, the agency can issue a finding of no significant
impact ("FONSI"), which presents the EA and discusses why the
agency found no significant impact warranting the preparation of a
full EIS." The agency's third option is to issue what is called a
"mitigated FONSI," in which the agency outlines mitigating
measures it will undertake in conjunction with its proposed action
to lower the action's impact below the threshold requiring an EIS.39
If the agency determines that an EIS is required, it will prepare
a draft EIS which it will submit for comment to any government
agencies with jurisdiction over the action as well as to the public.4 0
These comments become part of the administrative record
surrounding the EIS.4 1 The agency must then consider the
comments and incorporate discussion of the comments into its
final EIS.4 2
B. The Council on Environmental Quality
Along with creating a procedural framework within which
agencies must make their decisions, NEPA creates the CEQ.43 The
CEQ is a part of the Executive Branch, and its three members are
appointed by the President." While most of its functions are
largely advisory in nature,45 the CEQ takes on a somewhat
adjudicatory role under emergency circumstances.46
If an agency feels that "emergency circumstances" will not
permit it to comply with NEPA's requirements before it takes a
proposed action with significant environmental impacts, then the
agency can "consult with [the CEQ] . . . about alternative
arrangements."47 This function of the CEQ allows agencies to take
3840 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2008).
3 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2008).
40 NEPA § 102(2)(C).
41 id
42 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (2008).
4 NEPA § 202.
44 id
45 See NEPA § 204 (outlining CEQ duties to advise the President of trends in
the environment and to propose to the President measures which will "foster and
promote the improvement of environmental quality").
46 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2008).
47 id
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actions which, but for the CEQ's grant of alternative arrangements,
would be violations of NEPA, provided that such agency actions
are "necessary to control the immediate impacts of the
emergency."4 8 Any agency actions not directly related to
containing the emergency can still be reviewed by the courts under
NEPA.49
III. HISTORY OF THE CASE:
Up, DOWN, AND ALL AROUND NEPA
The procedural history and facts surrounding Winter are "rather
complicated."" For many years now, the Navy has conducted
integrated training exercises off of the coast of southern
California." In these exercises, submarines, surface ships, and
airplanes search for simulated enemy submarines.52 The exercises
are aimed at training sailors in the detection of ultra-quiet diesel-
electric submarines, which "pose a significant threat to navy
vessels."" To detect these enemy submarines, both Navy surface
ships and submarines must use what is referred to as MFA sonar.5 4
No Navy strike group can be deployed unless it has completed this
training, and the use of MFA sonar within these integrated
exercises is described by the Navy as "mission-critical.""
48 id.
49 See id.
5o Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 371 (2008).
51 Id.52 Id. at 370.
5 Id.
54 Id. Contrast "active" sonar, which actively sends out sound waves and
listens to their reverberations to determine the placement of objects in the water,
with "passive" sonar, which involves no production of sound, but only listening
for incoming sound waves from any number of sources, including enemy
submarines. Taking and Importing Marine Mammals, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,404,
37,405 (July 9, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216).
5 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371. Modem diesel-electric submarines are virtually
silent and cannot be detected by any means other than MFA sonar. Hundreds of
these submarines exist, some held by countries which, in the Navy's eyes, are
"[p]otential adversaries." Id. As such, training Navy personnel in the use of
MFA sonar is important. Declaration of Captain Martin N. May in Support of
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for A Preliminary Injunction,
430 [VOL. 10: 423
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The Navy's use of sonar has had negative environmental
repercussions. For instance, MFA sonar has been linked to
instances of certain species of whales, particularly beaked whales,"
beaching themselves on the shore. A study of one such "stranding
event" by the Navy concluded that its use of MFA sonar was "the
most plausible contributory source" of the beaching." One
hypothesis for explaining the way in which beaked whales are
affected by naval sonar is that, in response to hearing sonar, the
whales repeatedly dive and resurface, which can "lead to
embolism" and decompression sickness.
The Navy scheduled fourteen integrated training exercises
from early 2007 through January 2009.59 As a government agency,
the Navy is required to comply with NEPA when taking actions
that could significantly affect the environment.o As a first step in
the NEPA process, the Navy prepared an EA in February 2007.61
The Navy devoted its EA to studying the level of harm MFA sonar
would cause to certain species of marine wildlife.62 It divided
these harms into two classifications: Levels A and B harassment.63
Level A harassment, the more severe of the two, is defined as an
instance of physical injury, whereas Level B harassment is defined
as "temporary injury or disruption of behavioral patterns such as
migration, feeding, surfacing, and breeding."' The EA concluded
NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 8:07-CV-00335-
FMC (FMOx)).
56 Beaked whales are the world's deepest-diving air-breathing animal, and are
particularly sensitive to naval sonar. See generally Peter L. Tyack et al.,
Extreme Diving of Beaked Whales, 209 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY 4238
(2006).
5 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 383-84 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 7, at 22.
58 Tyack et al., supra note 55 at 4251.
59Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
60 See National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
61 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372. There was evidence to suggest that the Navy's
exercises were harmful to marine mammals. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
supra note 6, at 22; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
62 Joint Appendix at 112-15, Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239),
2008 WL 3586903.
63 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
6 Id.
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that MFA sonar, used over all fourteen of the Navy's planned
training exercises, would cause 170,000 instances of Level B
harassment and some 564 instances of Level A harm." Of these
564 Level A harms, 436 of them were thought to be visited upon a
beaked whale population that numbers only 1,121 in the southern
California waters.66 Yet, the EA concluded that the Navy's
training exercises would not significantly affect the environment. 7
Because of its FONSI, the Navy was not required to prepare an
EIS.68
Shortly after the Navy issued its EA and FONSI, the plaintiffs
sued the Navy in federal district court.69 The plaintiffs alleged that
the Navy had violated several environmental statutes, including
NEPA, and sought injunctive relief"0 The Navy contended that an
injunction would prevent it from conducting its training exercises,
which the Navy argued was unacceptable given the nation's
interest in maintaining a well-trained naval fleet.7 ' The district
court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction
barring the Navy's use of MFA sonar in its training exercises off of
the southern California coast.72 The Navy then appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which remanded to the district court to impose
injunctive measures which would allow the Navy to use MFA
sonar while mitigating the sonar's effects on marine wildlife. On
remand, the district court, relying on extensive evidence from the
65 Id. at 393 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 372.
68 Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2008).
69 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
70 Id.
71 See NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
72 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 8:07-cv-0035-
FMC). The District Court felt that the plaintiffs had demonstrated strong
probability of success on the merits for their allegations of the Navy's violations
of NEPA and several other statutes, and that there was a substantial likelihood of
irreparable harm if the injunction were not issued. See id at *3-* 11.
7 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373; NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir.
2007).
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plaintiffs and the Navy, imposed six injunctive measures on the
Navy's use of MFA sonar:7 4
1. Imposing an exclusionary zone, covering a distance from the coast
to twelve miles, within which MFA sonar could not be used;
2. increasing the amount of monitoring for marine mammals, both
during and prior to exercises;
3. requiring a ten minute monitoring period for helicopters before
they deploy "dipping sonar;"75
4. restricting the use of MFA sonar in "geographic chokepoints;" 76
5. requiring the complete shut down of MFA sonar when a marine
mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of the ship in question; and,
6. requiring that MFA sonar be powered down by six decibels (dB)
when a condition called surface ducting,7 7 during which sound waves
travel much farther in water, is occurring.7 8
The Navy then appealed once again to the Ninth Circuit,
challenging only the last two injunctive measures: the requirement
of a complete shutdown when a marine mammal is nearby, and the
requirement to power down during surface ducting."
Contemporaneous with its second appeal, the Navy sought
relief from the CEQ."0 The Navy claimed that its appeal to the
CEQ was necessary because the injunctions against its use of MFA
sonar in its training exercises created an emergency situation,
given the critical need to train its crews in the use of MFA sonar
74 NRDC, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1118-21.
7 Dipping sonar is a sonar-emitting device attached to a cable that is lowered
into the water from a hovering helicopter. See Joint Appendix at 371, Winter,
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (07-1239), 2008 WL 3586903.
76 A "geographic chokepoint" is a "strategic strait or canal which could be
closed or blocked to stop sea traffic." Declaration of Captain Martin N. May,
supra note 54, at n. 16.
n In water, sound generally travels faster at greater depths. Sound is also
generally refracted upwards in water, causing sound to go toward the surface,
thus slowing the sound. Given the right sea conditions, sound that is heading
toward the surface will be reflected downward. A series of upward refractions
and downward reflections then cause the sound to travel much farther than it
would under normal conditions. See Taking and Importing Marine Mammals,
72 Fed. Reg. at 37406 (July 9, 2007) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. Pt. 216).
78 NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1118-21.
7 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 373 (2008).
80 Id
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before deployment." In light of these "emergency
circumstances,"8 2 CEQ granted the Navy's application for relief."
This allowed the Navy to comply with an "alternative
arrangement" to NEPA, which included public notice of the
Navy's mitigation efforts and invitation for public input.84
With its relief from the CEQ in hand and its appeal to the Ninth
Circuit pending, the Navy applied once again to the district court to
have the last two measures of the injunction order vacated." The
district court refused to vacate its order, questioning the legality of
the CEQ's action." The Navy brought an emergency appeal, and
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, questioning the
reality of any "emergency circumstances" which the CEQ found as
the basis of its action." The Ninth Circuit further held that the
imposition of the last two measures of the injunction was unlikely
to affect the Navy's ability to train its fleet." The Navy finally
appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.89
8' See Decision Memorandum Accepting Alternative Arrangements for the
U.S. Navy's Southern California Operating Area Composite Training Unit
Exercises, 73 Fed. Reg. 4,189, 4,191 (Jan. 24, 2008).
82 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. When "emergency circumstances make it
necessary to take an action with significant environmental impact without
observing the provisions of [NEPA]," the agency, here the Navy, can consult
with the CEQ to make alternative arrangements to NEPA's procedural
requirements, namely the EIS. Such alternative arrangements are meant to
alleviate only the "immediate impacts of the emergency." Id.
83 Decision Memorandum 73 Fed. Reg. at 4,191-93.
84 id
85 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.
86 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1225-32 (C.D. Cal. 2008).8 7 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 681 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court of Appeals
and the District Court used the Chevron standard in determining that the CEQ's
finding that the Navy's need to avoid NEPA's requirements constituted
"emergency circumstances" was contrary to the plain meaning of CEQ's
regulations. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See
also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2008) (allowing CEQ to create alternative
arrangements when emergency circumstances exist).
88 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d at 699-702.
89 Winter v. NRDC, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008).
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IV. THE COURT'S OPINIONS
A. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a five-justice majority opinion.
The opinion begins by listing the elements a plaintiff must show to
obtain a preliminary injunction: "that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest."90 According to the
majority opinion, there were serious questions as to whether the
plaintiffs' claim in this case could pass muster on any of these four
requirements.9 1 The opinion focuses heavily on the balance of
equities between the Navy on the one hand and the environmental
interests of the plaintiffs on the other.92 The majority was also
concerned with the legal standards the district court used in
adopting its injunction, especially the district court's scant
discussion of the balance of equities between the parties." The
Court ultimately vacated the last two measures of the lower court's
injunction, which were the 2,200-yard shut-down zone and the
prohibition on using MFA sonar during surface ducting
conditions.9 4
1. The Plaintiffs' Claims and Their Likelihood of Success
The Court dealt briefly with this first prong of the test, the
plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, for the
appropriateness of a preliminary injunction." While the lower
courts both determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
the merits at trial, the Supreme Court gave some credence to the
Navy's contention that the plaintiffs' success was not likely given
the CEQ's determination of emergency circumstances.96 The
lower courts agreed with plaintiffs' argument that the CEQ was
90 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 542 (1987); see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
91 See Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. at 374-82.
92 Id. at 376-78.
93 Id. at 374--76.
94 Id. at 382.
95 See id. at 375.
96 id.
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incorrect in its interpretation of what constitutes emergency
circumstances.9 7 While the Court's discussion of this prong was
relatively cursory, its conclusions about the plaintiffs' likelihood of
success were ultimately unimportant to the Court's analysis, as the
Court attacked the plaintiffs' claims on other grounds.
The Court spent a significant amount of time dealing with the
possibility of irreparable harm to plaintiffs in the absence of
injunctive relief.98 The lower court stated that when a plaintiff can
show a likelihood of success on the merits, a court may grant an
injunction when the plaintiff shows a mere "possibility" of
irreparable harm.99 The Navy argued that requiring only a
possibility of irreparable harm is a misstatement of the standard for
granting injunctive relief, and that this alone is enough to overturn
the lower courts' rulings.' The Navy also argued that the
plaintiffs, in order to show an irreparable harm for which they
would have standing to bring a lawsuit, must show some "species-
level harm" that would directly adversely affect "their scientific,
recreational or ecological interests."'0 ' On the other hand, the
plaintiffs contended that no matter what constituted an "irreparable
harm," they would prevail on this point because the lower courts
found that it was "a near certainty" that such harm would occur.'02
In discussing the lower courts' assessment of the possibility of
irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, the Court raised two concerns.'03
First, the Court found that it is "not clear" whether the lower
courts' articulation of an improper standard of review has any
effect on its decision, given that the lower courts found "a near
certainty" of irreparable harm.' However, regardless of what
standard the lower courts adopted, the Court reasoned that they
9 7 Id.; NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 677-87 (9th Cir. 2008); NRDC v.
Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d, 1216, 1225-32 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
98 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76.
9 Id. at 375. Here, the irreparable harm to the plaintiffs is the injuries which
might be visited upon the marine mammals that the plaintiffs study, admire, and
wish to protect.
Ioo Id.
10 Id. (emphasis in original).
10 2 id.
103 Id. at 376.
4Id.
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applied those standards to the wrong facts.' 5 The Navy, at this
point in the case's long history of litigation, was challenging only
two of the six mitigating measures imposed in the district court's
original injunction.'06 Therefore, in the Court's view, the district
court should have considered the plaintiffs' likelihood of
irreparable harm given the remaining four mitigation measures
imposed on the Navy by that court, rather than considering the
potential harm without those protective measures.i' This is
"significant" in the Court's view because the remaining four
mitigation measures, particularly the twelve-mile coastal
exclusionary zone, would surely result in a reduced number of
harms visited upon marine life by MFA sonar, and would
accordingly change the analysis of the plaintiffs' likelihood of
harm. 108
2. The Public Interest and the Balance ofEquities
The Court went on to address the remaining two factors in the
test for the appropriateness of a grant of injunctive relief: the
balance of equities between the two parties, and the public
interest.' The balance of equities inquiry weighs the burdens and
hardships that will be placed on either party if the injunction is left
in place or lifted,"o while the public interest inquiry determines
whether the public will benefit most by the lifting or continuation
of the injunction."' The Court resolved both of these questions in
the Navy's favor."12
In doing so the Court relied heavily on the opinions and
statements of seasoned Navy officers." 3 One such Naval officer
pointed out that the need for training in MFA sonar is "mission-
critical,"'' 4 while other officers asserted that it would be extremely
05 id.
'o' Id. at 374.
107 Id. at 376.
1os Id.
109 See id. at 376-81.
0 Id at 376-77.
"' See id. at 378.
12 See id. at 376-81.
" See id.
114 Id. at 377; see also NEPA, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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difficult to train submarine crews effectively to detect enemy
diesel-electric submarines if the injunction's last two mitigation
measures were imposed."' In the Court's view, imposing the
mitigation measures in question would be tantamount to "forcing
the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine force,"
an outcome which would "jeopardize[] the safety of the fleet."' 16
The interests the Navy and the public have in a well-trained naval
fleet was weighed against the interests that the plaintiffs and the
public have in protecting the marine species that MFA sonar may
harm."' The Court noted that any ambiguity about the balance of
equities and the public's interest "does not strike us as a close
question,""' and it is therefore unlikely that the public would
choose the environmental interests over a well-trained Navy.
The Supreme Court analyzed these issues differently than the
lower courts. While the Supreme Court felt that the last two
mitigation measures of the injunction were overly burdensome on
the Navy, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit felt that the
imposition of the same measures would merely force the Navy to
"alter and adapt" its training methods." 9 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the 2,200-yard MFA sonar shut-down
zone was similar enough to the Navy's own 2,000-meter shut-
down zone for low-frequency active sonar as to be practically
indistinguishable.120 The Ninth Circuit also noted that several other
national navies' regulations require the shutdown of active sonar
when a marine mammal is detected within 2,000 meters of a sonar-
emitting ship.121 With regard to the restrictions on the use of sonar
during surface ducting conditions, the Ninth Circuit also
" Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377.
116 Id. at 378.
118 id
119 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1238 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also
NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008).
120 Winter, 518 F.3d at 701. Note that the difference between 2,000 meters
and 2,200 yards is a little less than thirteen yards.
121 Id. at n.67 (noting that NATO requires a shut-down of active sonar if a
marine mammal is detected within 2,000 meters, while the Australian Navy
requires such a shut-down if a marine mammal is detected within 4,000 yards of
the ship in question).
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determined that ordering these were not burdensome because the
Navy had previously certified submarine strike groups, which had
not previously been trained under surface ducting conditions, as
ready for deployment.122  With regard to these assertions, the
Supreme Court states that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
"reasoning [was] backwards," 23 and that the lower courts "did not
give sufficient weight to the views of several top Navy officials." 2 4
3. Abuse ofDiscretion and Order Vacated
The Supreme Court concluded its discussion by turning once
more to the balance of equities between the Navy's and public's
interest in a well-trained military and the plaintiffs' interests in
environmental protection.125  While the Court emphasized that it
did not mean to belittle the "importance of plaintiffs' ecological,
scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals," the
Court nevertheless held that those interests were "plainly
outweighed by the Navy's need to conduct realistic training
exercises to ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by
enemy submarines."126 Thus, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and vacated the district court's injunction order with respect to the
2,200 yard shut-down zone and the restrictions put in place during
surface ducting conditions.127
B. The Minority Opinions
In addition to the five-justice majority opinion, two minority
opinions were issued in this case, one by Justice Breyer, who
concurred in part and dissented in part, and another by Justice
122 Id. at 701-02.
123 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 380.
124 Id. at 379. The Court has great precedent for giving deference to the
determinations of military officials, even in the face of restrictions on
constitutional rights such as free speech. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 300 (1986) (noting that courts must "hesitate long before ... the
court ... tamper[s] with the established relationship between enlisted military
personnel and their superior officers," even when that relationship allegedly
resulted in discriminatory treatment toward the plaintiffs).
125 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381-82.
126 Id. at 382.
127 d
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Ginsburg, who dissented. Justice Breyer began by noting that the
plaintiffs' "argument favoring the District Court injunction is a
strong one." 28 However, he remained convinced that the Navy's
interest is weightier than the plaintiffs'.129 His strongest argument
was that the Navy offered as evidence several senior officers'
affidavits that had the overarching message that the mitigation
measures in question would be fatal to the Navy's mission to train
its sailors, however, neither lower court gave an adequate reason
why those affidavits were not accepted at face value.'30 Given
these facts, Justice Breyer concluded, like the majority, that the last
two mitigation measures were inappropriate as written and must be
vacated. '
Justice Ginsburg's opinion took a slightly different approach in
attacking the majority's conclusions. Rather than focusing on the
balance of equities between the two parties, Justice Ginsburg
framed her discussion as one concerning a simple violation of
NEPA's requirements. 3 2 In the case at hand, the Navy prepared an
EA that predicted some significant impacts on the environment,
but did not follow-up with an EIS.' However, at the time of this
case's decision, the Navy was in the process of preparing an EIS,
which was to be completed by January 2009, as part of the
alternative arrangements created by the CEQ.'34
128 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 382 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
129 Id. at 383.
30 Id. at 384-86.
"1' Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 386 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Breyer would have imposed a less stringent version of both of the
mitigation measures. In his opinion, MFA sonar can still be used, even if a
marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards, but only if that occurs during a
"critical point in the exercise." Id. at 387. He would also require total shutdown
of MFA sonar during surface ducting conditions if a marine mammal is detected
within 500 meters, with a sliding scale of reduction at greater distances. Id.
These restrictions are consistent with the Ninth Circuit's Order from February
29, 2008. See NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 704, 705-06 (9th Cir. 2008).
132 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 387-93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 388.
134 Id. at 387; see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that the "EIS is NEPA's core
requirement."' As such, "the timing of an EIS is critical"' 6
because it makes the public and government agencies aware of the
possible environmental harms that could result from the agencies'
actions before they take them.' Had the Navy prepared an EIS
before its training exercises as required under NEPA, plaintiffs
would have no grounds to mount a direct challenge to the Navy
under NEPA.'
Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that "[f]lexibility is the
hallmark of equity jurisdiction."'3 9 She is concerned that the
majority opinion leaves the impression that a plaintiff seeking
equitable relief, like a preliminary injunction, will be forced to
meet a set of formulaic, rigidly set bars and requirements to
prevail.'40 Rather, equity ought to be based on a "sliding scale" of
factors, wherein injunctive relief might be granted "based on a
lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very
high." 4 ' Justice Ginsburg concludes by noting that, in her view,
the balance of equities and the public interest lie with the plaintiffs,
and therefore the Ninth Circuit decision ought to have been
affirmed and the injunction upheld.'4 2
V. THE SLIDING SCALE AND MILITARY DEFERENCE
This case should have been decided in the plaintiffs' favor.
One way to overcome the majority's assertion that the plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of establishing a likelihood of harml"
would be to use the "sliding scale" Justice Ginsburg described in
her dissent.'" Historically, the driving force behind equity
135 Id. at 389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 390.
13 Id. at 3 89-90.
138 Id. The plaintiffs would still likely have claims under other environmental
statutes.
139 Id. at 391.
1401 d. at 391-92.
141 Id. at 392.
142 Id. at 393.
143 See id. at 374-76.
'" See id. at 392..
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jurisdiction was "the power of the Chancellor" to render a fair
decision based on "the necessities of the particular case."'45 As the
Court's precedent points out, the unquantifiable nature of
environmental harms favors the issuance of an injunction in most
cases.146  An injunction ought to be granted unless the
environmental harms at issue are slight or not likely to occur
compared to the other interests in a given case.147 At the very least
this will provide time for study and mitigation, both of which are
the goals of NEPA.148
The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Amoco
Production Co. v. Gambell. 149 In that case, the Supreme Court was
dealing with the Department of Interior's decision to lease oil and
gas rights off of the Alaskan coast.' The plaintiffs, two Alaskan
villages and an organization of Alaskan Natives, sought to enjoin
the sale of these leases, citing potential harm to their subsistence
way of life."' The Court, in discussing what must be shown before
a preliminary injunction can be issued, described the test as one
where a court "must balance the competing claims of injury" by
the parties to the suit to determine "the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding" of an injunction.'52 While this
formulation of the test for a preliminary injunction did not lead to
the actual issuance of an injunction in Gambell,"' such a test
would likely have a strong bearing on the outcome in Winter,
145 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 391-92 (citations omitted).
146 See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)
(noting that environmental harms are difficult to quantify, and that if such a
harm is "sufficiently likely, [then] ... the balance of harms will usually favor
the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment").
I47 See id.
148 See NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
149 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
O Id. at 534.
152 Id. at 542.
15 See id. The Court held that the required likelihood of harm to plaintiffs
had not been shown, while the defendant oil company had expended nearly $70
million in preparation for oil and gas exploration. Id. at 545.
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particularly because the lower courts established "a near certainty"
of irreparable harm to plaintiffs' interests.15 4
Furthermore, the formulation of the injunction test used by the
Supreme Court in Winter is inherently different from the Court's
earlier formulation in Gambell. While the Court in Gambell
characterized the test generally as one of balancing,' 5 in Winter,
the Court outlined a four-part test, of which each portion must be
satisfied before an injunction can be issued.'56 The newly defined
test from Winter places a greater burden on potential plaintiffs, in
that they must establish at the outset both their likelihood of
success on the merits and their likelihood of suffering irreparable
harm without injunctive relief.' This new, formulaic rubric for
the issuance of an injunction removes much of the flexibility that
has historically been the "hallmark of equity jurisdiction,""' and
will likely lead to a reduced number of injunctions in
environmental enforcement actions. Because of the Court's
historic recognition of the difficulties in quantifying and
preventing environmental harms,'59 and in light of a historic
preference for issuing injunctions to protect the environment,'60 the
formulation of the preliminary injunction test from the Gambell
case should be employed by courts when deciding environmental
enforcement cases.
Finally, courts confronted with scenarios similar to the one in
Winter can help themselves reach a different conclusion by taking
a different approach to the amount of deference given to military
officials. As the Court points out in this case, courts generally
''give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particularly
154 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008).
1 See Gambell, 480 U.S. at 534-42.
156 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.
1 See id. Note that the plaintiffs likelihood of suffering irreparable harm has
two distinct elements-the likelihood of the harm and the magnitude of the
harm. Under the test from Winter, if a plaintiffs case is deficient on either of
these two points, his bid for an injunction will be unsuccessful.
158 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 391 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
' See Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
160 See id.
SPRING 2009] 443
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
military interest."'"' There is often good reason for this, for most
judges do not "begin the day with briefings that may describe new
and serious threats" to the nation.162
However, there are some instances where judicial oversight of
military decisions is appropriate. One case which demonstrated
this in a scenario quite similar to the one in Winter was National
Audubon Society v. Dep't of the Navy.163 In that case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was confronted with the
Navy's decision to locate a new practice outlying landing field
("OLF") for its jets near a wildlife refige that served as the winter
home for several species of migratory waterfowl." The primary
issue in the case was whether the EIS which the Navy had prepared
prior to its construction of the OLF was sufficient.' 5 The Fourth
Circuit held, over the Navy's objections, that the Navy's EIS was
insufficient, and that an injunction was not overly burdensome
because the Navy had alternative methods of achieving its training
goals.166
National Audubon Society demonstrates that not all military
decisions are beyond the reach of judicial review. To be sure, the
military deference cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in
Winter'7 should apply to decisions involving purely strategic or
tactical questions, and would almost certainly place combat
decisions outside of the jurisdiction of the courts. However, when
it comes to decisions by the military that are largely logistical in
nature, courts should be more willing to inject themselves into the
military's decision-making process and correct any grievous harm
they may encounter.
"' Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377 (citation omitted).
162 Id. (citing Boumedine v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276-77 (2008)).
163 422 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2005).
'6Id. at 181-83.
1651 d. at 183.
166 Id. at 196 (noting both other potential OLF sites and the option of
"homebasing" alternatives (emphasis omitted)).
167 See Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court ultimately decided against the environmental
plaintiffs in this case, ruling that the Navy's and the nation's
interests in a well-trained military outweighed the admittedly
costly environmental harms the Navy will likely cause through its
use of MFA sonar. In this case, based on equitable principles, the
equitable doctrines that permeate the dissent from Justice Ginsburg
should have held sway. To further protect the environmental
interests at stake in future cases similar to this one, courts should
incorporate more equitable protections for the environment to
protect it from government over-reaching and malfeasance. An
increased reliance on the balancing aspects of the historic test for
the issuance of an injunction and a reduction in the deferential
treatment given to logistical military decisions can help to avoid
the unfortunate result wrought in this case.
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